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1) EINLEITUNG 
 
Seit den 80er Jahren, vor allem durch die methodische Weiterentwicklung von bildgebenden 
Verfahren, hat sich mit „Social Cognitive Neuroscience“ ein neuer Forschungsbereich entwickelt. In 
diesem Forschungsbereich geht es um die integrative Verbindung von kognitiven und 
sozialpsychologischen Theorien mit den Neurowissenschaften (Easton & Emery, 2005). Derzeit ist der 
Bereich der „Social Cognitive Neuroscience“ sehr populär. Dadurch ist ein enormer Anstieg von 
Publikationen zu diesem Thema zu konstatieren (Easton & Emery, 2005). Auch Zeitschriften – z. B. 
„Social Cognititve and Affective Neuroscience“ und „Social Neuroscience“ - sind für dieses neue 
Forschungsfeld aufgelegt worden. 
 
Durch die Etablierung der „Social Cognitive Neuroscience“ entsteht aber auch eine Reihe methodischer 
Probleme. So verweisen Easton & Emery (2005) darauf, dass sogar sehr einfach erscheinende Prozesse 
(wie z. B. visuelle Wahrnehmung) auf neuronaler Ebene von einem komplexen Netzwerk mit über 50 
kortikalen Arealen und Billionen von Neuronen gesteuert werden. Wie würde das nun aussehen, wenn 
man die neuronalen Grundlagen von sozialen Konzepten untersuchen würde?  
 
Die Untersuchung interpersoneller Interaktionen und menschlicher sozialer Prozesse ist äußerst 
kompliziert. Selbst moderne Methoden bildgebender Verfahren und Primatenstudien können hierbei 
nur teilweise Einblicke geben.  
 
Bisher sind die Methoden der sozial-kognitiven Neurowissenschaften zumeist begrenzt auf die 
Verwendung von visuellen sozialen Reizen oder die Beantwortung von Fragebögen, die während einer 
fMRI- oder EEG-Messung präsentiert werden. Die ökologische Validität solcher Methoden ist stark 
reduziert, da das tatsächliche Erlebnis der natürlichen Situation in diesen artifiziellen Situationen nicht 
gegeben ist. In Zukunft könnte durch die Weiterentwicklung von portablen EEG-Systemen (portable 
MRI-Scanner wird es nicht geben!) oder von mit dem Internet verbundenen Kameras das 
experimentelle Design von sozial-neurowissenschaftlichen Studien verbessert werden.  
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Die Problematik der ökologischen Validität soll in dieser Diplomarbeit auch als zentraler Aspekt 
angesprochen werden. Im ersten Manuskript wird von einem experimentellen Design berichtet, 
welches eine natürliche Situation simuliert. Es wird dadurch versucht, dem realen Erleben des sozial-
kognitiven Konzeptes während der Registrierung von Hirnaktivitäten näher zu kommen. 
 
Ein anderer methodischer Aspekt, der in der folgenden Arbeit behandelt werden soll, befasst sich mit 
einem Problem, welches Adolphs (2003) in seinem einflussreichen Review über die zehn zentralen 
Fragen sozial-kognitiver Neurowissenschaften schildert. Bei sozialen Phänomenen gibt es sehr viele 
verschiedenen Faktoren (Mediatorvariablen), die ausgeschlossen oder kontrolliert werden müssen 
(Adolphs, 2003). Nach Adolphs (2003) ist es sehr schwierig, alle diese Faktoren zu berücksichtigen. 
Dies kann dazu führen, dass viele Studien nicht signifikante Ergebnisse aufweisen. Das im Folgenden 
geschilderte experimentelle Design soll auch eine Möglichkeit liefern, ein soziales Konzept so zu 
erfassen, dass viele medierende Variablen kontrolliert oder ausgeschlossen werden können.  
 
Neben den methodischen Aspekten werden in den folgenden Artikeln auch die Effekte von Attribution 
auf ereigniskorrelierte Potenziale betrachtet.  
 
Attribution, definiert als die wahrgenommene Ursache von Ereignissen (Stroebe et al, 2003), ist seit 
den 60er Jahren ein zentrales Konzept in der Sozialpsychologie. Schon 1958 postulierte Heider, dass 
Menschen – ähnlich einem Wissenschaftler – geneigt sind, Ereignissen Ursachen zuzuschreiben, um 
Unsicherheit zu reduzieren. Heider (1958) unterschied hierbei zwischen externer und interner 
Attribution; also einer Ursache inner- oder außerhalb der Person. Bezogen auf den Leistungskontext 
und basierend auf Methoden der multidimensionalen Skalierung (Passer et al, 1978), entwickelte 
Weiner (1985) eine Klassifikation, welche einer 2x2x2 orthogonalen Taxonomie mit bipolarem 
Kontinuum pro Dimension entspricht. Weiner (1985) nannte hier die drei Dimensionen: Lokation, 
Stabilität und Kontrollierbarkeit. Lokation (intern/extern) beschreibt den „Ort“ der Ursache, während 
sich Stabilität (stabil/variabel) auf die zeitliche Struktur der Ursache bezieht. Kontrollierbarkeit 
(kontrollierbar/unkontrollierbar) weist auf den Grad des willentlichen Einflusses der Ursache hin. 
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Attribution hat bisher in den sozial-kognitiven Neurowissenschaften noch wenig Beachtung gefunden. 
In der folgenden Studie werden ereigniskorrelierte Potenziale betrachtet, die im Zusammenhang mit 
Entscheidungsfindung und der Überwachung von Aktivitäten stehen. Es geht also im weiteren Sinne 
auch um Funktionen, welche dem anterioren cingulären Kortex (ACC) zuzuschreiben sind (Bush et al, 
2000).  
 
Der ACC, welcher anatomisch im medialen Teil des Frontallappens anzusiedeln ist, ist auch Teil des 
limbischen Systems. Generell ist der ventromediale präfrontale Kortex von seiner funktionellen 
Anatomie her eine wesentliche Struktur für „höhere“ soziale Funktionen (klassisch hierzu: der Fall 
„Phineas Gage“) und auch für die Integration von Emotion und Kognition (Damasio, 1994). In ihrem 
populären Review berichtete Brothers (1990) auf Basis von Studien der Neurowissenschaften, 
Neurophysiologie, Neuropathologie und Primatenstudien über neuronale Strukturen, welche für soziale 
Interaktionen und Konzepte relevant sind. Unter dem Begriff „social brain“ nannte Brothers hier den 
anterioren temporalen Kortex, den Temporalpol, Kerne der Amygdala und den orbitofrontalen Kortex. 
Zahlreiche Studien beschäftigen sich in diesem Zusammenhang mit der spezifischeren Bestimmung 
präfrontaler Aktivierungen und sozialer Konzepte. Abbildung 1 gibt einen Überblick über die 
funktionelle Anatomie sozialer Funktionen des präfrontalen Kortex. 
 
 
Abbildung 1: Funktionale Anatomie sozialer Funktionen des medialen präfrontalen Kortex (aus: 
Amodio & Frith, 2006). 
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Für die Studie dieser Arbeit wurde die EEG-Methode (bzw. die Auswertung von ereigniskorrelierten 
Potenzialen) verwendet. Es wird daher hier auch kurz auf die generellen Grundlagen einer EEG-
Messung eingegangen. 
 
Die Methodik zur Untersuchung von Hirnaktivitäten hat ihre Anfänge erst in diesem Jahrhundert. Dass 
im Nervensystem Informationen elektrisch weitergeleitet werden, also Stromfelder entstehen, wurde 
erstmals durch die berühmten Froschschenkelexperimente von Luigi Galvani (1737-1789) bekannt 
(Birbaumer & Schmidt, 2006). 
 
Bei der EEG-Methode geht es um die Registrierung der elektrischen Hirnaktivität. Der Vorteil einer 
EEG-Messung - im Vergleich zu bildgebenden Verfahren - liegt in einer höheren zeitlichen Auflösung. 
Trotz Weiterentwicklung durch Programme, welche aufgrund bio-physikalischer Modelle die Quellen 
der Hirnaktivität bei EEG-Messungen berechnen können, unterliegt die räumliche Auflösung des EEGs 
der von bildgebenden Verfahren. Um den spezifischen Zusammenhang von Verhalten (in dieser Studie: 
Begehen eines Fehlers) und den korrelierenden Hirnaktivitäten zu ermitteln, wurden die EEG-Daten 
nach ereigniskorrelierten Potenzialen (EKP) ausgewertet.  
Im Gegensatz dazu würden bei einer Frequenzanalyse unabhängig vom onset eines Ereignisses 
Amplitude und Zeit verrechnet. Durch den zeitlichen Bezug zu dem spezifischen Ereignis können bei 
der EKP-Analyse Komponenten (Amplituden charakteristischer Stärke und zeitlicher Bezogenheit zum 
Ereignis) durch die Mittlung der zeitbezogenen EEG-Registrierung aus zufälligem Rauschen extrahiert 
werden. 
 
Allgemein werden beim EEG Feldaktivitäten von Zellensembles in kortikalen (hier vor allem 
Pyramidenzellen) aber auch in subkortikalen Arealen registriert. Birbaumer und Schmidt (2006) 
beschreiben, dass ein EEG-Signal aus exzitatorischen postsynaptischen Potenzialen (EPSP) an apikalen 
Dendriten der 1. und 2. kortikalen Schicht entsteht. Gemeint sind hier die Pyramidenzellen des Kortex, 
welche in einer charakteristischen Weise angeordnet sind. Die Dendriten dieser Zellen liegen in den 
schädelnäheren Kortexschichten, während die Zellkörper in relativ tieferen Schichten angesiedelt sind. 
Bei der Entstehung von EPSPs an den apikalen Dendriten durch exitatorische Fasern aus u. a. 
unspezifischen thalamischen Kernen kommt es durch die räumliche Ausrichtung der Pyramidenzellen 
zu einer Dipolstruktur.  
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Das EPSP löst im Extrazellulärraum um die Dendriten ein negatives Feldpotenzial (Senke) aus, 
während der Extrazellulärraum der Zellkörper positive Feldladung zeigt (Quelle). Registriert werden 
mit den Schädelelektroden also elektrische Spannungsschwankungen, welcher durch Feldpotenziale 
umgekehrter Polarität (Dipolstruktur) in der Großhirnrinde entstehen bzw. aus subkortikalen Schichten 
weitergeleitet werden. Diese Signale müssen verstärkt werden, da Schädelknochen und Kopfhaut eine 
dämpfende Wirkung ausüben. Bei der Analyse wird dann durch Mittelung das Signal vom Rauschen 
getrennt und es werden irrelevante Frequenzen wie auch Artefakte eliminiert. 
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Überblick über die folgenden Artikel 
  
Die Arbeit wird sich mit zwei Aspekten der sozial-kognitiven Neurowissenschaften beschäftigen:  
(1) Experimentelles Design von neurowissenschaftlichen Studien zum Thema Attribution. 
(2) Auswirkung von Attribution auf ereigniskorrelierte Potenziale.  
 
Der erste Artikel behandelt -  neben einer ausführlichen Darstellung klassischer sozialpsychologischer 
Studien zum Thema Leistungsattribution und Erkenntnissen der Neurowissenschaften zum 
Attributionsthema -  auch methodische Aspekte neurowissenschaftlicher Forschung. Insbesondere 
sollen auch die Besonderheiten von experimentellen Arrangements bei der neurowissenschaftlichen 
Untersuchung von höheren sozialen Prozessen betrachtet werden. Es wurde von mir ein neues 
experimentelles Paradigma entwickelt und evaluiert, welches eine optimale Vorgehensweise bietet, um 
Attributionsprozesse neurowissenschaftlich erfassen zu können.  
 
Mittels der neu entwickelten Methode werden im zweiten Artikel die Auswirkungen von Attribution 
auf ereigniskorrelierte Potenziale untersucht. Es wird deutlich werden, wie Erkenntnisse aus der 
klassischen Sozialpsychologie auf Phänomen auf neuronaler Ebene übertragen werden können. Drei 
frühe ereigniskorrelierte Komponenten (error related negativity (ERN), feedback error related 
negativity (fERN), P300) werden in der Studie betrachtet. Die ERN und eine frontomediale 
Negativierung nach Feedback onset (fERN) sind im Zusammenhang mit der Fehler- und der 
Feedbackverarbeitung in zahlreichen elektrophysiologischen Studien beobachtet worden (Hajcak et al, 
2005; Larson et al, 2006; Luu et al, 2003; Masaki et al, 2006; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2003; Ulsberger et 
al, 2006). Studien zeigten, dass die Komponenten durch den individuellen Wert und die Wichtigkeit 
des Fehlers für die Personen beeinflussbar sind (Boksem, 2006; Hajack et al, 2005; Luu & Tucker, 
2000; Pailing & Segalowith, 2003;). Es ist zu vermuten, dass Lerneffekte (eine spätere Verhaltens-
modifikation durch Fehlerdetektion) nur dann stattfinden, wenn der Fehler für die Personen relevant ist.  
Ist eine Person zum Beispiel nicht motiviert oder zeigt eine klinische Störung bzw. eine 
Extremausprägung einer Persönlichkeitseigenschaft, die dazu führen, dass sie Fehler als weniger 
wichtig annimmt, dann zeigt sich eine reduzierte Amplitude der ERN (Hajcak et al, 2005; Larson et al, 
2006; Luu et al, 2003; Masaki et al, 2006; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2003; Ulsberger et al, 2006).  
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Für die fERN gilt allerdings dabei die Besonderheit, dass sich der motivational-emotionale Einfluss 
wahrscheinlich nicht in der Amplitude (Hajcak et al, 2005) - sondern in der Auslösung - dieser 
Komponente zeigt. Luu & Tucker (2000) haben herausgefunden, dass eine fERN nach Feedback 
entstanden ist, wenn das Feedback keinen informativen, aber einen emotionalen Wert hat.  
 
Daraus abgeleitet habe ich mich in meiner Diplomarbeit mit dem Einfluss von Attribution auf die ERN 
und die fERN befasst. Basierend auf Erkenntnissen der Sozialpsychologie - dass externe Attributionen 
die Verantwortung und damit auch den Wert des Fehlers reduzieren - wurde die Hypothese untersucht, 
ob unterschiedlich wahrgenommene Ursachen des Fehlers (intern vs. extern) einen Effekt auf die ERN 
und fERN haben. Demzufolge wurde für die ERN bei interner Attribution eine höhere Amplitude 
erwartet als bei externe Attribution. Eine fERN wurde nur für die interne Bedingung erwartet, da nur 
hier das Feedback einen emotionalen Wert hat.  
 
Wie erwartet zeigte sich in den gemittelten EEG-Daten nur für die interne Bedingung eine fERN 
Komponente, was die Annahme von Luu & Tucker (2000) bestätigt, dass eine fERN auch durch einen 
emotionalen Wert des Fehlers entstehen kann. Für die ERN ließen sich keine Unterschiede in den 
Attributionsbedingungen feststellen. In der externen Bedingung war zusätzlich die P300 reduziert, was 
ebenfalls darauf hindeutet, dass für die extern attribuierenden Versuchspersonen der Fehler und das 
Feedback weniger „Wert“ hatten.   
 
 
 
Diese Studie stellt damit die erste Arbeit dar, die sich mit den Auswirkungen von Attribution auf 
ereigniskorrelierte Potenziale beschäftigt. Sie soll dazu anregen, das Attributionskonzept ebenfalls auf 
neuronaler Ebene zu betrachten, da Attribution ein wesentliches Phänomen ist, welches sich auf 
Verhalten, Emotion und Kognition - aber auch auf primäre Prozesse wie Wahrnehmung - auswirken 
kann.     
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Statt einer klassischen Schilderung der Arbeit werden in dieser Diplomarbeit zwei von mir erstellte 
Artikel präsentiert, welche beide zur Publikation an Fachzeitschriften gesendet worden sind. Die erste 
Arbeit ist bereits im „Journal of Neuroscience Methods“ 173 (1), 13-19 veröffentlicht. 
 
Anmerkung zu dieser Arbeit:  
Die entsprechenden Literaturangaben und Hinweise auf zusätzliche Materialien im Anhang befinden 
sich jeweils am Ende eines Kapitels. 
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Abstract  
Attribution Theory plays a central role in understanding cognitive processes that have emotional 
consequences; however, there has been very limited attention to its neural basis. After reviewing 
classical studies in social psychology in which attribution has been experimentally manipulated we 
developed a new approach that allows the investigation of state attributions and emotional 
consequences using neuroscience methodologies. Participants responded to the Erikson Flanker Task, 
but, in order to maintain the participant’s beliefs about the nature of the task and to produce a 
significant number of error responses, an adaptive algorithm tuned the available time to respond such 
that, dependent on the subject’s actual performance, the negative feedback rate was held at chance 
level. In order to initiate variation in attribution participants were informed that one and the same task 
was either easy or difficult. As a result of these two different instructions the two groups differed 
significantly in error attribution only on the locus of causality dimension. Additionally, attributions 
were found to be stable over a large number of trials, while accuracy and reaction time remained the 
same. Thus, the new paradigm is particularly suitable for cognitive neuroscience research that evaluates 
brain behavior relationships of higher order processes in ’simulated achievement settings’.  
 
Keywords: Causality Ascription, Manipulation of Attribution, Social Cognitive Neuroscience, Moral 
Emotions 
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1. Introduction 
Social Psychology and Neuroscience have developed primarily independently, however, more recently, 
studies using combined methodologies and theoretical approaches have begun to elucidate the neural 
basis of social cognition. This has been referred to as Social Cognitive Neuroscience (for 
comprehensive reviews see Adolphs, 2001 or Amodio and Frith, 2006). There has been, however, very 
limited investigation of the neural bases of attributions, even though they have been shown to interact 
with numerous psychological variables including emotion (Mc Farland and Ross, 1983), self-esteem 
(Borckner and Guare, 1983), expectations (Phares, 1957) and motivation (Rotter, 1954), as well as 
behavior and learning (Wasserman, 1990). This may in part be due to the lack of a reliable method to 
experimentally manipulate attribution, which also can fulfill the task demands of cognitive 
neuroscience studies.  
 
Heider (1958), developing ideas derived from classical philosophy and Gestalt psychology 
(Foersterling, 2001), formulated the concept of causal attribution, which is defined as the process of 
arriving at perceived causes of someone’s own and other people’s behavior (Weiner, 1992). Insights 
gained from attribution theory have been applied to a variety of research domains such as health 
psychology (Taylor, 1983) and personality styles (Rotter, 1954) as well as clinical (Foersterling, 1988), 
educational (Weiner, 1979), and organizational psychology (Folkes, 1990). Since the approach we 
developed addresses beliefs about someone’s own failure and success, we will focus on attributions in 
the achievement context.  
 
Weiner’s analysis of achievement behavior (Weiner et al, 1971), based on the work of Heider (1958), 
Kelley (1967), and Rotter (1954) remains an influential model (Foersterling, 2001). In European 
societies four causes are most frequently used to account for success or failure; ability, effort, difficulty 
and chance (e.g. Elig and Frieze, 1979; Weiner, 1992). Based on previous research using 
multidimensional scaling and factor analysis Passer et al., 1978 and Weiner (1985) developed a 
classification of perceived causes of effects according to a 2×2×2 orthogonal taxonomy with a bipolar 
continuum for each dimension; internal/external causality (the location of causality), 
stability/instability (the temporal nature of the cause) and controllability/uncontrollability (the degree 
of volitional control).  
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Weiner suggested that aptitude attributions are internal, stable, and uncontrollable, whereas attributions 
to task characteristics are external, stable, and uncontrollable. Futhermore he suggested that temporary 
effort ascriptions are internal, unstable, and controllable, whilst chance attributions are external, 
unstable, and uncontrollable.  
 
1.1. Manipulation of Attribution 
 
How stimulus information influences causal thinking, depends on the information (causes) individuals 
are provided with and the degree to which the possible causes co-vary with the effect (Kelley, 1967; 
Foersterling, 2001). Based on numerous studies (e.g. Phares, 1957; Weiner and Kulka, 1970; Meyer, 
1973) Weiner (1992) concluded that consistency (variance of the effect over circumstances), consensus  
(variance of the effect between people), perceived task characteristics and task structure were the main 
determinants of whether success or failure was ascribed to either the individual’s ability or the task’s 
difficulty. Weiner and Kulka (1970) examined the effect of consensus information on causality 
ascriptions. Participants were provided with information about the task outcome of a fictitious person 
and the social norm (rate of success of a large sample). The results demonstrated that increased 
consistency between the performance of the fictitious person and other individuals led to more external 
attributions (such as task characteristics). However, the importance of consensus information remains 
uncertain (for a discussion see Foersterling, 2001).  
 
Providing different information with the intention to modify ascriptions has been investigated since the 
early phase of attribution theory. Phares (1957) first changed outcome ascriptions by introducing an 
ambiguous task, in which success was attributed to either chance or ability. The ‘skill’ instruction 
described the task as being difficult but solvable dependent on the participant’s ability whereas the 
‘chance’ instruction described the task as being extremely difficult and solvable at pure chance level. 
Phares’s results demonstrated that expectancy of success or failure was closely linked to ‘skill’ and 
‘chance’ beliefs. A number of studies have shown that changes in expectancy correlate with the 
stability dimension, independently of the location of causality dimension (e.g. Meyer, 1973). 
Furthermore, changes in the stability more than the locus of causality dimension influence performance 
quality (Meyer, 1973).  
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However, the use of gambling tasks (a classical paradigm for chance dependent tasks) has been 
described as problematic for inducing causality ascriptions; individuals tend to misconceive  gambling 
tasks as being ability dependent, i.e. attribute them internally rather than externally  (e.g. Wortmann, 
1975). In order to ensure that experimental manipulation of the locus of causality dimension has the 
desired effect and to avoid confounding this with the stability/instability dimension, changes in 
expectancy and performance should be equal for external and internal attributions.  
 
Based on these experimental findings, manipulation of perceived causality has also been used in 
therapeutic approaches (for an overview see: Foersterling, 1985, Foersterling, 1988). In a 
therapeutically oriented ’reattribution’ approach Brockner and Guare (1983) investigated whether 
individuals with low self-esteem can improve task performance when causal ascriptions to task 
difficulty were introduced. They asked two groups of participants to work on an insolvable concept 
formation task. Before starting the task subjects in the experimental group were presented with fake 
information on the performance of ’previous subjects’. For the ‘external group’ the information 
described the task as relatively difficult, by showing that ’previous participants’ did very poorly, 
whereas the task was described as relatively easy for the ‘internal group’. Brockner and Guare could 
demonstrate that the information on social norms combined with that of task characteristics 
successfully modified the subject’s attributions for task failure. In addition, as predicted, low self-
esteem individuals improved their performance in the external manipulation group. 
 
More recently, using the CDS-II (The revised Causal Dimension Scale, Mc Auley et al, 1992) 
questionnaire for manipulation check, Van Dyck and Homsma (2005) found that, although 93% of their 
participants recognized ’time pressure’ as an obvious cause of errors, 19% attributed their performance 
failure to internal causes (e.g. ‘not enough time for me’) rather than to external ones. They assumed 
that even when people agree with an external cause, they might not necessarily form an external 
attribution. This highlights the problem of measuring attribution when only a ’concrete’ cause is 
offered. To avoid this problem, Homsma et al. (2007) gave ’explicit instructions’ in order to manipulate 
attribution. They told their subjects to think about possible causes for errors and to attribute them to 
internal, external, stable or unstable causes. Although subjects appeared to make attributions as 
expected, they might have, by being compliant, been following these instructions but not been truly 
generating these attributions.   
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Cognitive Neuroscience and Attribution  
 
More recently, attribution has been investigated with neuroscience approaches (Lieberman et al., 2002; 
Blackwood et al., 2003; Harris et al., 2005). According to the causality of observed behavior 
Liebermann et al. (2002) described a possible neural system that would underlie the dual process model 
of attribution. The authors distinguished between a reflective system and a reflexive system, which they 
postulated had a different neuro-anatomical basis. In this model automatic initial dispositional 
attributions are produced by the reflexive system, whereas the reflective system is responsible for 
propositional thoughts; on the neural level the lateral temporal cortex, including the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS), parts of the temporal lobes, and the temporal poles (as part of the reflexive system) may 
be responsible for processing the information involved in dispositional attributions. To further 
investigate this model Harris et al. (2005), using fMRI and an  experimental paradigm based on 
Kelley’s attribution theory, found activity in the STS associated with person attributions (internal 
attribution of observed behavior). The authors speculated that dispositional ascriptions of other 
people’s behavior might recruit parts of the neuronal circuits associated with “Theory of Mind”.  
 
However, whether ascriptions of someone’s own behavior activate the same neural circuits is uncertain, 
since no judgment of observed behavior is required. There appears to be only one brain imaging study 
that investigated self ascriptions. Seeking to identify the neural systems involved in self serving biases 
(external attribution of negative events and internal attributions for positive events) and self 
responsibility, Blackwood et al. (2003) found activity in the left lateral cerebellar hemisphere, 
bilaterally in the pre-motor cortex, and the right lingual gyrus, when individuals reported internal 
attributions of experienced positive and negative events (self responsibility). In contrast, external 
attributions (ascribing effects to other people or outside causes) resulted in activation of the STS. That 
STS activity was found with external attributions is notable, since it supports the involvement of the 
STS in ascribing events to other people’s dispositions or responsibility. The authors also assumed that 
the brain activity associated with self responsibility is related to ’simpler internal models of goal-
directed action’. In addition, self serving vs. non-self serving biases yielded different brain activation 
patterns. The authors used ten statements of the IPSAQ (Internal, Personal, and Situational Attributions 
Questionnaire) to which participants responded to during the fMRI scan. However the authors realized 
that the methodology resulted in a small number of described external attributions and a limited variety 
of ascriptions in some subjects resulting in several data sets being discarded.  
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That very few studies have investigated attribution with neuroscience methodologies may in part be 
due to the problem of high-level social cognition eliciting brain activation patterns that reflect a number 
of confounding variables, limiting interpretation of the findings (Kok et al., 2006). Cacioppo et al., 
(2003) stated that when using subtractive techniques for imaging data, the interpretations of the 
subtracted images depends on the different task demands between the experimental and the control 
condition which may not reflect a single psychological variable. In addition, Cacioppo et al. observed 
that using the subtractive method requires that the information processing is linear and additive which 
may not hold for complex social phenomena. 
 
1.2. The present study 
 
The aim of the present study was to develop an experimental design that enables both, the manipulation 
of causal ascriptions of one’s own behavior in ’a real-life achievement context’, and its concurrent 
application with cognitive neuroscience methods, e.g. EEG or fMRI. We used a modified, speeded, 
arrowhead version of the Erikson Flanker Task (Erikson and Erikson, 1974). Since a Flanker task has 
often been used in electrophysiological research (e.g. Fiehler et al., 2005) task demands for 
electroencephalogram (EEG) data analysis are given. A large number of erroneous and correct trials, 
under all conditions, allows for the use of averaging techniques. Although fMRI does not have the 
same time resolution as electrophysiological responses, a Flanker Task can still be utilized in imaging 
studies. Ullsperger and Cramon (2001) developed an interleaved design for image acquisition, to 
improve temporal resolution with a flanker task. We hypothesized that a Flanker Task could be adapted 
so that it would be perceived as either an “easy concentration test” or as a “very difficult task” resulting 
in different attributions for success or failure providing an adequate task structure to modify causal 
ascriptions (Weiner, 1992).   
 
Based on Fiehler et al. (2005) we developed an adaptive algorithm, aiming to deliver negative (for late 
and error responses) and positive feedback at about chance level. This was required to achieve equal 
performance levels in the different groups and to correct for individual differences. Additionally, we 
expected instructions (such as; the task is easy vs. difficult) to be quite plausible in an ambiguous 
situation when experience of previous success and failure during the task was balanced. In the study a 
two block design has been used with the manipulative instruction given after the first block. Due to this 
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design task conditions were kept equivalent and the first blocks could serve as control conditions since 
no information on the nature of the task had been provided to either group. In order to avoid 
confounding expectancy and performance influences (Meyer, 1973; Phares, 1975) instructions that 
aimed to provoke ability ascription for failure (internal- stable- uncontrollable) in one group and 
difficulty attribution for failure (external- stable- uncontrollable) in the other group were used. 
Following Brocker and Guare (1985) and Weiner (1992) consensus information and task characteristic 
information were different between the two instructions, whereas instructions were otherwise equal. 
We hypothesized that under this arrangement a stable attribution manipulation could be achieved over a 
large number of trials with performance held at chance level by the adaptive algorithm without subjects 
being aware of this. Additionally, we expected differences in attribution exclusively on the locus of 
causality dimension. Explicitly, individuals who would receive the ‘easy concentration test’ 
information were expected to attribute errors to their own performance, whereas those persuaded that 
the task is difficult were expected to attribute mistakes to task characteristics. 
 
 
2. Material and Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
Twenty-four, healthy, students (female, mean age 25.13) who gave informed consent participated in 
this study. All participants had no history of neurological or psychiatric diseases and had normal or 
corrected to normal vision.    
 
2.2 Task 
 
An adapted, speeded arrowhead version of the Erikson Flanker Task (Erikson and Erikson, 1974) was 
employed using an in- house presentation software, running under Linux. Within each trial five white 
arrowheads were presented in a horizontal row against a black screen. The arrowheads consisted of two 
arms both 2 cm in length. The viewing distance of approximately 60 cm resulted in a 2° visual angle 
horizontally and vertically. Participants were instructed to concentrate on the central arrowhead and to 
ignore the other ones. To increase task difficulty a target stimulus could either point left, right, up, or 
down, whereas the distracters varied in pointing left or right. Participants had to respond with their left 
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index finger if the target arrowhead pointed left or up and with their right index finger if the target 
pointed right or down. There were compatible trials, i.e. the flankers pointed in the same direction as 
the central target, and incompatible trials, i.e. the flankers were pointing to the opposite direction and 
with target ‘up’ to the right and ‘down’ to the left. Compatible and incompatible trials were presented 
in pseudo-random order having the same frequency. Subjects were informed that they could make two 
types of error, either pressing the wrong button or responding too slowly. With a delay of 1000ms 
following each target onset one of three different symbols in the centre of the screen indicated the 
actual performance. Green plus signs indicated correct responses in due courses and red minus signs 
incorrect ones. When the response was out of time a message appeared on screen 650 ms after stimulus 
onset saying, the response was tardy - please respond faster next time. This message was followed by a 
blue minus sign. There were two blocks, each of 350 trails, with a break of various lengths in between. 
 
2.3 Adaptive Algorithm 
 
As already mentioned an adaptive algorithm (Fiehler et al., 2005) was used in order to achieve a 
negative feedback (error responses and time outs) rate of about chance level (50%). According to this 
algorithm a response time value (RV) was dynamically adjusted within the range of 200 to 800ms in 
steps of 100ms always after 40 consecutive trials dependent on the subject’s actual performance value 
(PV). This performance value (PV) in turn was counted up or down by 1 for a positive or negative 
feedback respectively, with each single trial. Initially, RV was set to 500ms and PV to 0. With each 
40th  trial RV was decreased by 100ms if PV was > 20 and RV > 200ms in order to enforce a higher 
rate of negative feedback - otherwise RV was increased by 100ms; in either case PV was then set to 
zero. For an illustration of the algorithm see appendix A. Full programming details for the flanker task 
and this algorithm are available from the authors.  
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2.4. Experimental Manipulation of Attribution 
 
Subjects were randomly assigned to two groups. Both groups received the same standard task 
instructions before starting the experiment with a first block as a set of ’practice trials’. Thereafter, one 
of the two following instructions was given verbally in German language (Comments relevant to 
attribution are shown in italics):  
 
Instruction A: ’The practice part is over and I will now tell you the experiment’s purpose. This is an 
ability test. We will measure your ability for attention and concentration during the next block. As you 
must have realized during the practice part, the test is quite easy. You simply have to press the left or 
the right button. People make very few errors, because it is so easy.’ 
 
Instruction B: ’The practice part is over and I will now tell you the experiment’s purpose. This is a so 
called Flanker Task. This task is deliberately designed in a way that people commit many errors. As 
you must have realized during the practice part, the task is quite difficult. You have a very short time to 
respond, People make lots of errors, because it is so difficult.’ 
 
With instruction A, a fake picture of a “concentration test” was also presented before starting the 
second block. 
 
At the end of the second block participants were asked to complete an adapted version of the IE-SV-F 
(Fragebogen zur Erfassung von internalen/externalen und stabilen/variablen Attributionen in 
Abhaengigkeit von Erfolg und Misserfolg, Dorrmann and Hinsch, 1983“; ’Questionnaire for capturing 
internal/external and stable/instable attributions depending on success and failure’). The questionnaire 
allowed the measurement of the locus as well as the stability dimensions in success and failure 
situations during the flanker task. We adopted nine statements to the flanker task situation, maintaining 
the original responses (e.g. “I think the failure was due to a lack of my ability.”). This resulted in a 36 
item questionnaire with a scale of 1 to 4 for each item (“Applies in no way” to “Applies completely”). 
At the end of the experiment participants were debriefed and informed about the true purpose of the 
study.  
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3. Results 
3.1. Behavioral Data 
 
Table 1 shows reaction time (RT) and performance data for each group pre and post instruction. RT 
was defined as the time between stimulus onset and the button press 
 
Table 1: Mean proportions of correct, error, and ’time out’ responses for compatible, incompatible, and all trials separated for blocks.  
(Standard Errors in parentheses)  
 
                       Compatible Trials                                      Incompatible Trials                                All Trials 
 
                       Response Rate      Response Time            Response Rate     Response Time          Response Rate     Response Time 
                       (%)                       (ms)                              (%)                      (ms)                             (%)                      (ms) 
 
 
Performance data of the first block 
 
 
Prior Instruction A 
 
Correct 66.87 (6.64) 347.23 (50.71) 41.49 (10.03) 429.73 (31.10) 54.2 (5.19) * 
Error 6.52 (3.32) * 19.18 (15.66) 317.95 (57.19) 12.91 (9.1) * 
Time out 26.52 (8.71) * 39.25 (13.34) * 32.89 (10.67) * 
 
 
Prior Instruction B 
 
 
Correct 65.1 (7.13) 350.46 (52.13) 42.23 (8.47) 433.07 (35.04) 53.64 (3.82) * 
Error 7.15 (4.48) * 21.68 (13.54) 324.83 (68.35) 4.43 (8.01) * 
Time out 27.74 (9.82) * 36.00 (8.49) * 31.92 (8.97) * 
 
Performance data of the second block 
                      
Post Instruction A 
 
Correct 73.36 (8.29) 321.55 (40.70) 43.55 (10.27) 394.2 (35.97) 58.51 (5.26) * 
Error 5.30 (2.30) * 23.83 (17.20) 286.08 (37.44) 14.51 (8.65) * 
Time out 21.34 (8.65) * 32.62 (11.52) * 27.00 (9.39) * 
 
 
Post Instruction B 
 
 
Correct 70.75 (7.47) 314.97 (48.90) 42.20 (9.67) 376.38 (56.08) 56.46 (4.31) * 
Error 6.77 (6.13) * 26.36 (18.18) 285.54 (49.26) 16.75 (11.42) * 
Time out 22.48 (9.82) * 31.44 (11.15) * 26.97 (9.90) * 
 
 
Note: In most participants the number of errors on congruent trials was too small for further analysis.  
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As can be seen in Table 1 performance effects typical for flanker tasks in general were found with no 
significant differences between the groups. Independent of the instructions, participants committed 
more errors on incompatible trials in both blocks.  
 
Using a three-way repeated measures ANOVA with the between subject factor Instruction (2 levels: 
Instruction A or B), and three within factors: Response (2 levels: correct and incorrect), Block (2 
levels: block 1 and block 2), and Compatibility (2 levels: compatible and incompatible)  significant 
interactions Compatibility × Response (F (2, 21) =71.6, p<0.000) and Response × Block (F (2, 21) 
=12.5, p<0.000) were found. The latter possibly indicated practicing over time. No interaction with the 
between subject factor Instruction reached the level of significance even after setting alpha to 0.2. 
Thus, the different instructions did not lead to differences in accuracy.  
 
Typical effects were also observed for reaction time. RTs were longer for incompatible than for 
compatible trials. This observation was statistically confirmed using a repeated measure ANOVA for 
correct responses with the ‘within’ factors Compatibility and Block and Instruction as a between 
subject factor. It revealed a significant main effect of Compatibility (F (1, 20) = 205.13, p<0.000). The 
ANOVA for RTs of incompatible trials only, with the ‘within’-factors Response and Block and 
Instruction as a between subject factor, resulted in a significant main effect of factor Response (F (1, 
20) = 40.26, p<0.000). That demonstrated that errors were associated with shorter reaction times. Again 
the main effect of the factor Block (F (1, 20) = 309.33, p<0.000) indicated practicing effects over 
blocks. Importantly, no significant interaction was found ascribable to Instruction, which emphasized 
that RT was not influenced by the instructions.  
 
However, since performance might have been influenced by the balanced control of negative/positive 
feedback, the two groups were compared additionally on the performance and RT data of the first 40 
trials of the second block (immediately after instruction A or B was given). As noted earlier, the first 
adjustment of the response window occurred after the 40th   trial. Therefore, responses to these 40 
initial trials were not influenced by the adaptive algorithm.  
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Table 2: Mean proportions of correct, error, and ’time out’ responses, separated by instructions.  
(Standard Errors in parentheses)  
 
                       All Trials (40)                                             Incompatible Trials                                 
 
                       Response Rate                                            Response Time           
                       (%)                                                              (ms)                              
 
The first 40 trials of the second block were chosen, since the effect of the adaptive algorithm was not yet present.   
 
 
Post Instruction A 
 
Correct 75.00 (15.25) 290.80 (49.50) 
Error 15.75 (12.75) 417.50 (50.90) 
Time out 9.50   (9.00) * 
 
Post Instruction B 
 
Correct 69.75 (11.25) 299.3 (82.80) 
Error 19.75 (11.75) 401.5 (59.30) 
Time out 10.50  (9.00) * 
 
 
Note, that response times were only computed for incompatible trials, because the number of errors on compatible trials was 
 insufficient for further analysis.  
 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, there were no differences in performance and RT ascribable to the different 
instructions. This was again confirmed by ANOVAs using these first 40 trials. The analysis on 
performance data did not yield a significant interaction Instruction x Response (F (2, 19) =.392, 
p=.618). Equally no significant interaction Instruction x Response (F (20, 1) =1.385, p=.253) was 
found for RT data, demonstrating that the different instructions had no influence in this respect.  
 
Additionally, as can be seen in Table 1 when taking all negative feedback trials (error and late 
response) into account, the adaptive algorithm indeed led to approximately 50% negative feedbacks in 
all conditions. And, importantly, after debriefing at the end of the experiment, all participants reported 
that they had not been aware of the effects of this control algorithm. 
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3.2. Manipulation Check 
For each attribution factor; chance, ability, difficulty and effort, an average score of corresponding 
items of the adapted IE-SV-F (see above) was calculated for each subject individually.  
 
Table 3: Mann-Whitney U-test statistics for the attribution questionnaire data 
 
                                                                                    Condition                                
 
                                                  Instruction A                                             Instruction B                                       
                                                                      
                                      n                         Mean Rank                 n                          Mean Rank          U            Z 
 
Average Scores 
 
Success Ability 12   9.83 12 15.17 40.00 -1.89 
Success Difficulty 12 12.96 12 12.04 66.50 -.33 
Success Chance  12 10.75 12 14.25 70.00 -.12 
Success Effort   12 12.67 12 12.33 51.00 -1.24 
       
Failure Ability  12 16.33 12 8.67 26.00 -2.70** 
Failure Difficulty  12 7.50 12 17.50 12.00 -3.45** 
Failure Chance  12 9.88 12 15.13 58.50 -.79 
Failure Effort  12 11.38 12 13.63 40.50 -1.87 
 
p<.05; ** p<.01 
 
Mann- Whitley U-test statistics yielded significant differences depending on the instructions. As shown 
in Table 3 Instruction A provoked significantly more failure attributions to ‘ability’ than Instruction B 
(U=26.00, Z=-2.69, p<.01). In addition, Instruction B led to fewer failure attributions to ‘task 
difficulty’ than Instruction A (U=12.00, Z=-3.49, p<.000). There were no significant differences on the 
dimension ‘stability’ (chance and effort attributions) and in ‘success’ attributions. It is noticeable, that 
the group differences were highly significant (p<.000; P<.01), especially in comparison to previous 
manipulations of causality (e.g. Brokner, 1983, Stiensmeier-Pelster, 1995; Van Dyck, 2005; Homsma, 
2007). Following Newcombe´s (2006) method for calculating effect sizes and confidence intervals for 
non-parametric group comparisons, we found a large effect for failure attributions to ability (U=26.00, 
Z=-2.69, p<.01, θ=.18, [ .07; .41]) and a very large one for failure attributions to task difficulty 
(U=12.00, Z=-3.49, p<.000, θ=.08, [ .02;  .29]). 
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4. Discussion 
 
In this study an adapted version of the Erikson Flanker Task was developed and tested where the 
individual error-levels were kept at approximately 50 percent. Using this method the investigation of 
state attributions and emotional consequences using neuroscience methods would be possible. The task 
was administered to two groups two times. After an initial block, members of one group were 
instructed that the task is an easy concentration test, while those of the other group received the 
instruction that the task is quite difficult. 
 
While typical effects for flanker task performance in general were found, it could also be shown that 
the two groups differed significantly in their evaluation of the perceived causes of errors depending on 
the instruction they received. Since a manipulation check was administrated after the participants 
finished the second block, we can assume that the experimental manipulation of attribution remained 
stable over the 350 trials of the second block. It should be noted that previous attempts to manipulate 
achievement attribution were not capable of being used for numerous trials (e.g. Feather, 1967; 
Brokner and Guare, 1983; Van Dyck and Homsma, 2005; Homsma et al., 2007). The paradigm used in 
the present study changed attributions over numerous trials and therefore would be able to facilitate the 
acquisition of event related brain potentials (ERP). Furthermore it has been demonstrated that the 
groups solely differed in the localization dimension and not within the stability dimension. According 
to classical social psychology (e.g. Phares, 1957; Meyer, 1973) we concluded that there were no 
differences in expectations between the groups. In addition, according to the self reports and based on 
the subjects performance (error and time out responses) and reaction times, no differences were found 
on the effort dimension. Since performance was controlled by the adaptive algorithm we additionally 
compared performance data and reaction times of the first 40 trials of the second block, in order to 
avoid a possible bias due to the adaptive control. Again, no performance and reaction time differences 
were found indicating that the two groups did not differ in effort. This experimental paradigm, 
therefore, successfully evoked isolated differences in the locus of causality dimension by suppression 
of potential confounds, which is essential for an unambiguous interpretation of imaging data in 
cognitive neuroscience research (Cacioppo, 2003; Kok et al., 2006). Changes in attribution, however, 
would be expected to influence subsequent emotional responses (Weiner, 1992). 
 
Our approach to the experimental manipulation of attribution could not be used in a within group 
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experimental design since it would not be possible to persuade an individual that the same task was on 
one occasion easy and on another difficult. Although a between group design is generally less powerful 
than a within group comparison, our method produced a very large behavioral effect size with the 
possibility of a similarly large effect at the neural level. Our approach as well as techniques previously 
used to manipulate attribution are not compatible with counter balanced experimental designs, since 
manipulation of attribution can only be produced either immediately, or after an initial trial when the 
same task is involved (e.g. Feather, 1967; Brokner and Guare, 1983; Van Dyck and Homsma, 2005; 
Homsma et al., 2007). With our paradigm learning effects were shown not to differ between groups 
during the second block, which excluded at least one possible confound. It, therefore, appeared unlikely 
that the two groups would have differed significantly in any other time dependant variable, and thus 
differences in brain activity during the second block should reflect modification of attribution.  
 
The Erikson Flanker Task, as a speeded reaction time task, has often been used to investigate event 
related potentials, associated with committing errors (e.g. Gehring, et al, 1993). Approximately 80 ms 
after committing an error, a negative deflection in the ongoing EEG can be observed. This event related 
potential (ERP) has maximal amplitudes at fronto-central electrode sites and has been referred to as 
Error Related Negativity (ERN). Following negative feedback, an equal distributed component can be 
observed on frontal- central recording sites approximately between 250 ms and 350 ms after feedback 
onset, named the, Feedback Related Negativity (fERN) (Holroyed &Coles, 2002). Numerous studies 
have found associations of the ERN amplitude with emotion and motivation (e.g. Hajack et al, 2004; 
Luu &Tucker, 2000), however, no study has yet investigated error related ERP-components and 
attribution. 
 
Using our approach the neural basis of actor ascriptions in the achievement context and their emotional 
consequences could be further investigated. According to Weiner (1985) depending on the perceived 
cause of an event specific emotions can be elicited. Numerous studies have provided evidence for the 
coherence between causality ascriptions and emotions (i.e. McFarland & Ross, 1982; Weiner, 1997). 
Feather (1967) demonstrated that failure in a task that is perceived as being ability dependent is rated 
more aversive and unattractive for individuals than failure in a chance dependent task. Additionally, 
moral emotions, such as shame or guilt, associated with causal ascriptions (for an overview see Weiner, 
1992) could be further explored. Using the methodology described, an “on-line” elicitation of 
attribution related affects could be achieved, since during the experiment participants actually feel the 
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emotions associated with different attributions in the simulated achievement situation. This might avoid 
previously described limitations of using affective pictures to provoke affects, which always requires 
self reports of the actual emotional experience (Amodio and Frith, 2006). Moral emotions (guilt and 
embarrassment) have been investigated with fMRI by presenting sentences containing embarrassing, 
guilt, or neutral information. Importantly, both emotions were accompanied by activity in the medial 
prefrontal cortex and the left posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). However, STS activation was 
also observed with the ascription of events to other people’s dispositions or responsibility (Blackwood 
et. al.; 2003; Harris et. al., 2005). Following Weiner (1985) guilt is associated with self responsibility 
as reflected in internal attributions. We suspect that further research, using our approach could help to 
elucidate the neural basis of moral emotions clarifying these conflicting findings. 
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Appendix A: 
Algorithm 1 lists the pseudo code for the Erikson Flanker Task and the adaptive algorithm. This 
algorithm was designed to achieve equal performance for the different groups and to correct for 
individual differences. Furthermore, the error rate (negative feedback) was held at approximately 50 
percent throughout each block. 
 
Algorithm 1. Adaptive Erikson Task() 
 
Require: itemlist /* array of items */ 
Set: rv = 500 /* initial response time value */  
Set: pv = 0 /* initial performance value */ 
foreach item in itemlist do 
 /* item presentation*/ 
 Present: itemlist[item] 
 rt <= collectReactiontime() /* in ms */ 
 answer <= collectAnswer() 
 /* feedback and adaption of performance value*/ 
 if (rt <= rv & answer == 'correct') then 
  Present: positiveFeedback() 
  Set: pv = pv + 1 
 elseif (rt <= rv & answer == 'wrong')  then 
  Present: negativeFeedback() 
  Set: pv = pv - 1 
 else 
  Present: timeoutFeedback() 
  Set: pv = pv - 1 
 end if 
 /* evaluation of subject's performance */ 
 if (item mod(40) = 0)  then 
  if (pv >= 20 & rv > 200 ) then 
   /* decrease response time value */ 
   Set: rv = rv – 100 
  elseif (pv < 20 & rv < 800 ) then 
   /* increase response time value */ 
   Set: rv = rv + 100 
  end if 
  Set: pv = 0 /* reset performance value */ 
 endif 
end foreach 
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Abstract  
The role of achievement attribution on error and feedback processing was examined. We used a 
recently developed method to manipulate the perceived causes of error occurrence. Subjects responded 
to a modified flanker task while electrophysiological data were recorded. After each trial subjects 
received additional feedback indicating the correctness of their responses. The Error related negativity 
(ERN), an early component associated with error commission, did not show differences according to 
the attribution manipulation. Importantly however, a fronto-medial negative deflection equal to the 
feedback related negativity (fERN) after the feedback stimulus onset discriminated between positive 
and negative feedback in all individuals of the group that, following the attribution manipulation, 
attributed errors to their ability. This suggests that the additional emotional valence of error 
commission associated with internal attribution, resulted in activation of brain regions concerned with 
the emotional significance of error and feedback in task performance leading to the elicitation of a 
negative deflection after the feedback. Furthermore, a significant reduction in the P300 amplitude was 
observed in association with external failure attribution suggesting that this was perceived to be of less 
relevant to the subject. Since achievement attribution has not previously been investigated in 
neuroscience research, we suggest attaching importance to the attribution concept in error processing 
models as a mediator between cognitive processes and emotional and behavioural outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Attribution was a major focus for research in social psychology in the 70s and 80s. During this time a 
number of studies demonstrated the influence of causal ascriptions on related constructs such as 
emotion, behavior, motivation, expectation, and learning (i.e. Feather 1978; Mc Farland & Ross, 1983; 
Rotter, 1954; Wasserman, 1990; for an overview see Foersterling, 2002; Weiner, 1992). 
 
In social neuroscience there are only a few studies, seeking to elucidate the neural basis of causality 
ascription and their consequences (for a review see Terbeck et al, 2008). As yet there has been no 
research on the effects of different self state attributions on a neural level. Given the major implications 
of attribution to related psychological constructs that have been demonstrated on a behavioral level, 
investigations on a neural level should contribute to the theoretical understanding of these cognitive 
processes.  
 
After briefly describing attribution theory and recent EEG studies on error and feedback related 
potentials we will describe our study of the effects of causal ascriptions on error processing potential 
components using EEG methodology. 
  
1.1. Attribution Theory in social psychology 
1.2.  
Attribution in social psychology was originally defined by Heider (1958) as the perceived causes of an 
event. Attribution theory had major implications for a variety of applied disciplines however, since our 
approach involves the manipulation of the perceived causes of error commission, we will here only 
focus on attributional determents of success and failure events. Weiner’s classical attributional analysis 
of achievement behavior (1985) postulated four causes that Europeans most frequently used to explain 
success and failure outcomes (ability, task characteristics, effort and chance) (for an overview see 
Weiner, 1992). According to Weiner (1985) ability and task characteristics attributions are stable over 
the time, such that the expectation for further outcomes does not change. Additionally, aptitude 
attributions are internal ascriptions (a cause within the person) and task characteristics are external 
oriented attributions. 
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Behavioral studies in classical social psychology support the importance of attribution in guiding 
behavior and learning (Wasserman, 1990) by influencing motivation (i. e. Rotter, 1954, Weiner, 1985) 
and emotion (i. e. McFarland & Ross, 1983). Committing an error that is ascribed to one’s own (low) 
ability has been reported to be judged more aversive than externally attributed errors (Feather, 1967). 
Whereas the importance and salience of errors has been shown to be reduced in external failure 
attribution (such as task difficulty), since the subject feels less responsible for their mistakes (Weiner, 
1992). 
 
1.3.  Error and feedback related components 
The ERN 
A negative deflection in the ongoing EEG can be observed after error commission in speeded reaction 
time tasks, named the Error Related Negativity (ERN). The ERN peaks approximately 80 ms post 
response and is maximal at fronto-central recording sites (Fz, Fcz, Cz)  (Falkenstein et al, 2000; 
Gehring et al, 1993; Holroyed & Coles 2002; Niewhuis 2001). Source localization analysis that allows 
a multivariate mathematical based estimation of the underlining neural generators of scalp recorded 
potentials has indicated that the ERN is generated in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Dehaene et 
al, 1994; Miltner et al, 1997; vanVeen & Carter, 2002). Furthermore fMRI studies have found ACC 
activation during error processing (Carter et. al, 1998; Ullsberger & Cramon, 2003).  
 
Due to the close temporal relation to error commission, the ERN was originally considered to signal the 
detection of an error (Falkenstein et al, 1991). Holroyed & Coles (2002) suggested that the ERN is 
generated in reinforcement learning as a result of disinhibition of neurons in the ACC when an outcome 
is worse than expected and that the error signal is used “to train the ACC to optimize performance on 
the task at hand”.  Luu and Tucker (2004) however speculated that error related potentials reflect an 
affective evaluation of the situation with distress occurring when the expected outcome of an action 
fails to produce an emotional salient goal (Luu & Tucker, 2004).  
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Changes in the magnitude of the ERN amplitudes associated with changes in emotional or motivational 
states have been reported in numerous studies (Hajcak et al, 2005; Larson et al, 2006; Luu et al, 2003; 
Masaki et al, 2006; Pailing & Segalowitz 2003). Specifically, reduced motivation has been shown to 
result in lower ERN amplitudes in a number of studies (Hajcak, et al, 2005, Larson et al, 2006 and 
Pailing & Segalowitz, 2003). Personality factors, possibly mediating between emotional and 
motivational valence of error commission and feedback stimuli, have also been shown to influence the 
ERN (Boksem et al, 2006; Luu et al 2002; Pailing & Segalowitz 2003). These results are consistent 
with an early study by Gehring et al, (1993) who found that the ERN is sensitive to the importance of 
the error for the participant.  
 
The fERN 
After the onset of a feedback stimulus an equally distributed component can be observed at frontal-
central recording sites between 250 ms and 350 ms after feedback onset, named the feedback related 
negativity (fERN) (Holroyed & Coles 2002; Miltner 1997). Fronto-medial negativity has also been 
reported with monetary losses in gambling tasks (Gehring & Willoughby 2002a), in response to “bad” 
as opposed to “good” targets (Tucker et al 1999), and when subjects evaluate a trait as bad rather than 
good (Tucker et al 2003). Whether these various negative components can be reliably distinguished 
from each other according to function or localization remains uncertain (Gehring & Willoughby 2004; 
Holroyed & Coles 2002; Luu et al 2004). 
 
In addition to influencing the ERN some studies have also shown that motivation influences the fERN 
(Hajcak et al, 2005; Luu et al 2003, Masaki et al 2003). However the findings have been inconsistent. It 
has been suggested that the feedback related component might be insensitive to the valence of the 
outcome, such as the magnitude of monetary incentives (Hajcak et al, 2005). Nevertheless emotional 
and motivational factors may determine if an fERN component occurs. Luu et al (2003) demonstrated 
that a medial frontal negativity differentiated between different types of feedback where the feedback 
was restricted to the emotional value of the subject’s performance.  
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In accordance with the impact of emotion and motivation on error potentials, abnormalities in these 
components (ERN and fERN) have also been found in a variety of psychiatric conditions associated 
with changes in mood and error salience including obsessive compulsive disorder (Gehring & 
Willoughby 2002b), anxiety disorders (Landouceur et al 2006), paranoid schizophrenia (Kopp & Rist, 
1999) and major depressive disorder (Tucker et al 2003).  
 
1.4.  Error processing in the brain and causal ascriptions 
 
As yet an investigation of causality ascriptions for error occurrence has not been conducted on a neural 
level. However, this has been approached indirectly by Ulsberger et al (2006) who simulated technical 
malfunctions leading to failure that was externally attributed. The authors found that malfunctions and 
internally induced errors led to equal activation patterns in the medial prefrontal cortex.  The authors 
concluded that since they had explicitly mentioned the possibility of malfunctions in the instructions 
subjects were able to compensate for externally induced errors. However, achievement attribution was 
not specifically addressed in this study.  
 
As noted earlier, at a behavioral level attribution was related influence and mediate emotion, 
motivation, expectation, behavior, and learning, as also reflected in different personality styles (Rotter 
1954) and a number of psychiatric disorders (Foersterling 1988). For example changes in attribution 
has been shown to be a significant factor, as reflected in deviant attributional styles (increased internal 
failure attribution), especially in major depressive disorder (for an overview see i.e. Sweeney et al, 
1986). Since on a neural level it has been demonstrated that depression is associated with increased 
fERN amplitude (Tucker et al, 2003a) it could be hypothesized that this effect is mediated by the 
attributional style.  
 
Since the value of the error is hypothesized to be affected by different motivational and emotional 
states (Hajcak et al, 2005; Larson et al, 2006; Luu et al, 2003; Masaki et al, 2006; Pailing & Segalowitz 
2003) personality factors (Boksem et al, 2006; Luu et al 2002; Pailing & Segalowitz 2003) and 
psychiatric conditions (such that error sensitivity is increased) (Gehring & Willoughby 2002b; Kopp & 
Rist, 1999; Landoucer et al 2006; Tucker et al 2003) it is important also to consider changes in 
attribution since this has been shown to modify error valence on a behavioral level (i.e. Feather 1967; 
Weiner 1985; see Weiner 1992 for an overview).   
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Furthermore, based on the finding of Luu et al (2003), that an fERN component is seen with feedback 
that is emotionally significant it may anticipated that an fERN would occur following feedback for 
internally attributed errors.  
 
1.5. The present study 
 
We have argued that the achievement attribution concept is crucial for learning and behavior as 
mediated through emotion and motivation and that those factors also play an important role in the 
neural processes of error and feedback processing, therefore assessing the role of causality ascriptions 
on error and feedback perception and processing on a neural level becomes an important area of 
research.    
 
Given that internal attribution of an error is associated with greater distress  and the feedback has more 
emotional significance we hypothesized that the importance of error and the feedback would differ 
among different causal attributions of performance errors. Specifically we expected a larger amplitude 
for internal vs. external attribution on the ERN component and a negative deflection after negative 
feedback solely for the internal manipulation. 
 
We understand that the elicitation of two error signals (ERN and fERN) within one experimental 
design has been reported to be difficult since subjects generally already realize during their response 
that an error has been made and therefore performance feedback would be expected to provide little 
additional information (Holroyed & Coles, 2002). Nevertheless, in accordance to the findings of Luu et 
al (2003), we suspected that the emotional valence of the feedback for the internal attribution condition 
would be retained and therefore a visible negative deflection could be elicited within this experimental 
arrangement.     
 
To investigate the effect of causal ascription on error processing we used a recently developed method 
(Terbeck et al 2008) to experimental manipulate the perceived causes of error occurrence.  
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2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
 
Twenty four, neurologically healthy, right handed, female student volunteers participated in this study 
(mean age 25.13). Participants had normal or corrected- to normal vision. After receiving written and 
oral information about the procedures participants gave written informed consent. Importantly subjects 
were naive to the experiment; they had never participated in a study inducing causality ascriptions 
before. Since the average of responses required a minimum of trials for meaningful analysis two 
subjects had to be excluded (one of each group) because they had too few error trials (less than 5% in 
each block). Thus a total number of 22 participants were included in the further analysis.  
 
2.1. Stimuli and Procedure 
 
An adapted, speeded, arrowhead version of the Erikson Flanker Task (Erikson & Erikson, 1974) was 
administrated.  Sets of five arrowheads (i.e. >>>>>) were presented on a computer screen with a 2° 
visual angle horizontal and vertical for each stimulus at a viewing distance of 60 cm. Participants had 
to respond with their left index finger if the central arrowhead pointed left or up while they had to 
respond with the right index finger if the target arrow pointed right or down. Compatible (<<<<<, 
>>>>>, <<^<<, >>v>>) and incompatible (<< > <<, >> < >>, <<v<<, >>^>>) trials were presented 
randomly such that they were 50% incompatible trials.  The onset of the flanker stimuli preceded the 
onset of the target flanker stimuli by 100ms. Each flanker set remained on the screen for 200ms and 
disappeared simultaneously. Subjects received the information that both responding too slowly and 
pressing the wrong key would be judged as an error. According to the subject’s performance three 
types of symbolic feedback (blue and red minus indicating late or wrong response) were presented 
1000ms after each target stimulus onset. The inter stimulus interval for the flanker set onset was 
randomised between 800ms and 2800ms with 1800ms on average. There were two blocks, each of 350 
trials, with a break of various lengths in between.  
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Based on the work of Fiehler et al. (2005) we developed a modified adaptive algorithm (Terbeck et al 
2008) that increased the error rate by manipulating, depending on the current participants performance, 
the available time to respond such that subjects received approximately 50 % negative feedback (wrong 
key press and late response/ performance and time out error) in all conditions. If an individual was for 
example quite good in the flanker task performance the time window, in which an error was judged as 
an error, was increased, making time out errors more likely (for the programming description of the 
algorithm see Terbeck et al 2008). We could show that under this arrangement the subjects had an 
overall error and time out rate of 50 % within each block, without being aware of the manipulation. 
  
An error rate of 50 % was necessary for the attribution manipulation because confounds could be 
avoided and failure experience were held equal for both groups. Additionally the attributionally 
relevant instructions, such as the task is difficult (see section 2.2) could just be made believable if 
subjects had the experience of balanced success and failure events during their performance before (for 
a detailed description see Terbeck et al 2008). 
 
2.2. Manipulation of Attribution 
 
Subjects were randomly sorted to two groups both received the same standard task instructions before 
starting. After an initial block which was introduced as a practice session (note again, that due to the 
adaptive control, subjects experienced 50% performance and time out errors in this block), half of the 
subjects received the information that the task was a very easy concentration test (Instruction A/ 
“internal group”) while for the others the task was described as being very difficult (Instruction B/ 
“external group”) (for the precise instructions see Terbeck et al 2008). After the instructions, subjects 
performed the second block, again under the adaptive control. 
 
We could show that these different attributionaly relevant introductions between the blocks provoked 
internal state attribution for failure in one group and an external error ascription in the other group 
during the second block (Terbeck et al 2008). This means that one and the same task was differently 
perceived for the two groups. 
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In order to ascertain whether attribution had been modified by the different introductions subjects 
completed a questionnaire that was constructed by adapting the IE-SV-F (Ein Fragebogen zur 
Erfassung von internalen vs. externalen und stabilen vs. variablen Attributionen in Abhaengigkeit von 
Erfolg und Misserfolg, ’Questionnaire for capturing internal/external and stable/instable attributions 
depending on success and failure’; Dorrmann & Hinsch, 1983). The questionnaire contained 36 items 
that we adapted to the flanker task situation on a four point scale, assessing the degree of causal 
ascriptions to chance, ability, difficulty, and effort (see also here Terbeck et al 2008 for further 
descriptions). After the experiment the participants were informed of the true purpose of the study. 
 
2.3.  EEG Recording and Analysis 
 
The EEG was recorded using 64 channels placed in an elastic cap (Easy-cap® system). All electrodes 
were referenced to a sterno-vertebral electrode. Vertical and horizontal EOG were registered from the 
outer canthin of each eye and above and below the right eye. Electrode impedance was kept below 3 
kΩ. A DC-amplifier with input impedance of 100 GΩ was used for data recording. Sampling rate of 3 
kHz was used for initial recording with on-line filtering at 100Hz. Data were subsequently digitalised at 
250 Hz.   
 
Off-line the EEG Data were band pass filtered (0.16 Hz-12Hz); secondary eye movement and blink 
artefacts were eliminated using a linear regression approach (Lamm et al, 2005).  Afterwards trials 
were visually inspected such that trials with remaining artefacts (i.e. heart and muscle artefacts) were 
excluded from further analysis. An EEG segment from -200ms and 2000ms before the onset of the key 
press was isolated and further analysed.  ERPs were obtained by averaging the data according to output 
(correct response, incorrect response, time out), group (instruction A, instruction B), and time (pre- and 
post instruction).  
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For the computations of the ERN data were baseline corrected to a -200ms and 0 ms interval before the 
key press. The ERN was defined as the minimum peak within a time window ranging from 0ms to 
200ms after the subjects response.  For the analysis of the fERN component the EEG was baseline 
corrected to an interval between -200ms and 0ms before the feedback onset. The FERN was defined as 
the minimum value within a time window ranging from 250ms to 400ms after the feedback onset. 
Because measures of the FERN confound with other ERP components such as P300 (i.e. Niewhuis et 
al, 2004) we additionally measured the peak- to- peak differences between those components. Here the 
amplitude of the determent fERN amplitude was subtracted from the P300 magnitude. The P300 was 
defined as the maximal amplitude within a time window of 150ms to 350 ms after the feedback onset.  
If a difference could not be identified (since the fERN could not be established in every individual (see 
Holroyed & Coles, 2002)) the fERN was judged as zero. Due to intra-individual latency differences of 
the P300 and fERN amplitude the fERN and P300 was assessed on the individual averages. 
 
2.4. Statistical Analysis  
 
For the manipulation check the average scores of each subject were computed and assessed using a non 
parametric test (Mann Whitley U-statistics). Performance data for the flanker task were conducted 
using repeated measure analyse of variance (ANOVA) the same procedure was used on average ERP 
data. All statistical analysis were based on electrode Cz since visual inspection of the individual 
averages showed the most sharp peak deflection at this scalp point additionally the chosen electrode 
has been selected for statistical analysis elsewhere (i.e. Holroyed & Coles, 2002).  
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Behavioral Data 
3.2.  
The manipulation of attribution resulted in different failure attributions according to the instructions the 
subjects received during the blocks. Specifically the instruction describing the task as very easy 
resulted in significant higher failure ascriptions to ability (U=16.5, Z=-2.933, p=.002) and lower 
attribution to task difficulty (U=12, Z=-3.213, p=.001) than instruction B. (see also Terbeck et al, 
2008).  
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Flanker task behavioral results showed typical effects of flanker task performance previously reported 
in a number of studies (Bruijn, et al, 2004, Ehils et al, 2005, Hajcak et al, 2005, Pailing & Segalowitz, 
2003and Ullsperger & Cramon, 2006). Incompatible trials were associated with more errors (F 
(1,20)=66.453, p<.001) and an increased reaction time (F (1,20)=, p<.001) in comparison to congruent 
trials. No differences between the groups according to response time and accuracy could be determined 
(Alpha=.2).  
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3.3.  Event Related Potentials 
 
The ERN 
 
Figure 1a 
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Figure 1b 
 
Figure 1a, Figure 1b: Response locked error related negativity at electrodes Fcz, Fz, Cz. Instruction A 
(top), instruction B (bottom). Key press occurred at time zero. The output × group interaction yield no 
significant effect (F(1,20)=.068, p=.797). 
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In Figure 1a/b ERP waveforms at fronto-central recording sites (Fcz, Fz, Cz) are shown for each 
condition. The response locked average was conducted separately for each outcome (correct, incorrect) 
and each block (pre and post instruction).  The grand average for the group presented with instruction 
A is shown on the top panel of the figure the external condition (associated with instruction B) on the 
bottom panel.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 1 approximately 80ms after the response onset the ERN could be elicited 
during error trials in each group before and after the manipulation. We performed a repeated measure 
analysis ANOVA for the amplitude at Cz having the output (correct/incorrect) as within and the groups 
as between factors. Before the instruction a significant main effect of output (correct vs. incorrect 
response) (F(1,20)=27.668, p<.000) but no significant group output interaction (F(1,20) =2,675, 
p=.118) was found. As expected the groups showed no differences in the ERN amplitude before the 
manipulation. Post instruction again a main effect of “output” could be found (F(1,20)=17.661, 
p<.000). Additionally the results of the output × group interaction yield no significant differences 
(F(1,20)=.068, p=.797) suggesting that the instruction did not lead to differences in the ERN amplitude.   
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Additionally, to specifically demonstrate the absolute effect of error and correct responses, and to 
account for a possible small number of subjects, we evaluated the ERN effect on difference waves. 
 
 
Figure 2: Difference waves for the ERN on central midline electrodes 
 
In Figure 2 a trend can be seen; such that the difference of internal group (black lines) increases post 
instruction (dashed line), while the difference of the external group (grey lines) reduces post 
instruction. However, repeated measure ANOVA did not reach significance level here F (20,1)=.77, 
p>.2. 
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The feedback related component 
 
 
Figure 3a 
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Figure 3b 
 
 
Figure 3a, Figure 3b: Feedback-locked grand averages at electrodes Fcz, Fz, Cz. Instruction A (top), 
instruction B (bottom). Feedback onset is at 0 ms. An increased negative deflection, peaking roughly 
300ms after negative feedback, was just constantly visible in the group receiving instruction A. 
Repeated ANOVA revealed significant interaction output × group post instruction (F(20, 1)=5.151, 
p<0.05).   
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Figure 3 presents the feedback locked ERP averages assessed at Fz, Cz and Fzc for correct and 
incorrect trials before and after the manipulation instructions separated for each group (top and bottom 
panel). As expected, due to less informative value of the feedback, the fERN component is reduced and 
less visible in both groups before the instructions. Importantly, an increased negative deflection, 
peaking roughly 300ms after negative feedback, was just constantly visible in the group receiving 
instruction A (internal group). These results were confirmed using repeated measure analysis of 
variance for each time course (pre and post instruction). Before the attributionally relevant instructions 
there was neither a main effect of output (positive vs. negative feedback) (F(1,20)=.620, p=.440) nor an 
interaction with the group factor (instruction A vs. Instruction B) (F (1,20)=.187, p=.670). As we 
predicted, after the manipulation, a significant output × group interaction could be determent (F(1, 
20)=5.151, p<0.05) suggesting that the attribution manipulation had a different effect on the two groups 
during feedback processing. As reported previously (see for example Niewhuis, 2004) the fERN 
component is affected by changes in the P300 amplitude. To eliminate this confound we also assessed 
the P300 amplitude.  
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Figure 4a 
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Figure 4b 
 
Figure 4a, Figure 4b: Feedback- locked ERPs at electrode Cz. Instruction A (top), instruction B 
(bottom). These measures also show P300 magnitude differences affecting fERN amplitudes. A 
significant reduction in the P300 magnitude was assessed for the external condition post instruction F 
(20,1)=6.364, p<0.05. A peak to peak analysis (P300, fERN) revealed a significant interaction time × 
output× group effect (F(20,1)=4.943, p<0.05).  
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The grand average of error trials before and after the manipulation at electrode Cz for both groups is 
shown is Figure 4. It can be seen that after the instruction the P300 amplitude peaking approximately at 
250ms after feedback onset is reduced in the external group while the deflection remains the same in 
the internal group. Confirming this we conducted an ANOVA for the time period after the instructions 
according to the P300 amplitude values resulting in a significant interaction output × group (F (1, 
20)=6.364, p<0.05) suggesting that the attribution manipulation had a different effect on the P300 
amplitude according to the feedback type.  
 
To rule out an alternative explanation due to confounding of the P300 amplitude with the fERN 
amplitude we measured the fERN deflection also based on peak-to peak differences by subtracting the 
P300 amplitude from the fERN component. Taking this into account a two factorial ANOVA (output 
(positive/negative feedback); time (before and after the instruction) and within factor group (instruction 
A, instruction B) for fERN amplitude yielded a significant interaction of output × time × group 
(F(20,1)=4.943, p<0.05). As we predicted, the attribution differently affected the feedback processing 
of positive and negative feedback.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
As we have also shown before (Terbeck et al 2008), manipulation of attribution resulted in significantly 
different causal ascriptions. The group receiving the introduction that described the task as a relatively 
easy concentration test attributed mistakes in the second block of the flanker task to their ability, while 
the group receiving an instruction describing the task as difficult attributed errors to task difficulty. 
Typical behavioral effects for flanker task performance could be found, whilst the experimental 
manipulation of attribution had no effects on flanker task performance or reaction time. 
 
We found a sharp, constant, medio-frontal negativity after the feedback onset, equivalent to the fERN, 
which discriminated significantly between positive and negative feedback only in the group that 
attributed errors to their ability. There were no significant differences between positive and negative 
feedback for any other conditions. 
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The absence of a visible negative deflection after additional feedback in a flanker task has also been 
reported by Bruijn et al (2004). As noted earlier, the difficulty of producing two error signals (ERN, 
fERN) within one experiment has been discussed by Holryed & Coles (2002) suggesting that the less 
information the feedback stimulus provides, the less constant and visible is the magnitude of the fERN. 
Using a gambling task with different mappings (100% mapping if participants were contingently 
rewarded associated with a particular button press vs. 50% mapping if subjects were randomly 
rewarded regardless of the key press). Holroyed & Coles (2002) showed that the 100% mapping 
resulted in an increased ERN and a reduced fERN over time while the 50 % mapping showed an 
opposite pattern. The authors suggested that by the time subjects had learned the association between 
key press and reward the fERN would decrease because it would not contain any additionally 
information about the subject’s performance. This is consistent with our finding that there was no 
visible fERN component in the external group as well as in the internal group before the manipulation. 
However, since we found a sharp negative deflection after feedback onset in the group that attributed 
errors to their ability we suggest that the additional emotional valence associated with internal 
attribution as reported in classical social psychology studies (Feather et al, 1967, Rotter, 1954, Weiner, 
1992) elicited the feedback component. This finding is consistent with Luu et al (2003), who reported 
fronto-medial negativity after feedback which they postulated only contained emotional valence. In 
their study,  
 
Luu et al (2003) used a delayed-feedback paradigm so that the performance information, which was 
presented prior to a target arrow, did not provide relevant information related to the immediate 
response but they suggested that the emotional valence as a performance indicator would be retained. 
The authors found a feedback related negativity, suggesting that the fERN tracked the negative 
affective response to the feedback. Therefore we speculate that the negative deflection after the 
feedback, only following internal attribution could be ascribed to the elicitation of medio-frontal 
negativity caused by emotional significance of the feedback, which is associated with internal 
attribution (i.e. Feather et al 1967). 
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As reported by Nieuwenhuis et al, (2004), the fERN amplitude is likely to vary with the magnitude of 
the P300 amplitude. We also assessed the amplitude of the P300, showing that a significant reduction 
of the P300 amplitude could be observed for external attribution. The P300 component has been 
reported to be associated with basic information processing, reflecting working memory processes and 
attention (Sutton et al, 1965). It could be hypothesized that the reduced P300 after instruction B 
reflected less attention and interest in the feedback stimulus. P300 amplitude changes have also been 
seen when there are fluctuations in the arousal state of the subject (see for example Polich & Kok, 
1995). In our study external attribution may well have reduced arousal. Additionally Olofsson et al 
(2007) suggested that intense emotional pictures (pleasant and unpleasant) elicited an increased P300 in 
comparison to neutral stimuli. Furthermore Yeung & Sanfey, (2004) have reported a reduced P300 
amplitude as the magnitude of the error decreased. Thus the reduced P300 amplitude we found with 
external attribution for errors could be interpreted as reflecting less emotional significance to the 
negative feedback stimulus. Importantly however, we also evaluated the fERN component peak to peak 
amplitude in order to separate the different component effects. We found, that the effect of differences 
between the fERN and the locus of causality persisted even when the confounding effect of the P300 
was considered. 
 
Even though we also expected differences in the ERN magnitude, since numerous studies have 
reported changes in the ERN associated with error valence (Falkenstein et al, 2000; Gehring, et al, 
1993; Niewhuis, 2001) we could not find significant differences in the ERN between the two groups. It 
could be postulated that the recall of the information given in the pre-task instruction and the evaluation 
and judgment about the cause of the error occurred subsequently to error awareness and therefore did 
not influence the early components. Seeking to identify, the affective context induced modulations of 
the ERN Larson, et al (2006) reported significantly larger and earlier peaking amplitudes of the ERN in 
the context of pleasant backgrounds. In contrast Moser et al, (2005) could not find any impact on the 
ERN amplitude in fear induced vs. control conditions. Additionally, motivational related changes of the 
ERN amplitude have been reported to be mediated by personality differences (Pailing & Segalowitz, 
2003).  Further studies evaluating the effect of the attributional personality style, could possibly clarify 
these findings. 
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Additionally, it might be suspected that differences in the amplitude of early and later error and 
feedback signals differ in state vs. trait factors, such that the state manipulation of attribution cannot 
affect early potentials, while a deviate attributional style (as noted before to be also present in various 
psychiatric conditions) would lead to ERN differences. Since abnormalities in the error signals have 
been in clinical conditions such as major depressive disorder for the ERN and the fERN, further 
research could investigate, whether these abnormalities in error and feedback component amplitudes 
are still present after attribution manipulation or attributional retraining (Foersteling, 1988).   
 
Since this has been the first investigation of the influence of causality ascriptions on error related 
components further research is needed to support these initial findings. However, since numerous 
behavioral studies have reported that attribution influences emotion, motivation, cognition and 
behavior (i.e. Feather 1978; Mc Farland & Ross, 1983; Rotter, 1954; Wasserman, 1990; for an 
overview see Foersterling, 2002; Weiner, 1992) we therefore suggest that attribution is an important 
topic for neuroscience research.   
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Hierzu im Anhang:  
SPSS Tabellen (ERN, Differenzwellen ERN, fERN, Differenz ERN-P300) 
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4) ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER ARBEIT 
 
 
In dieser Arbeit wurde ein experimentelles Design zur neurowissenschaftlichen Erfassung von 
Attribution entwickelt, evaluiert und im Zuge von EEG-Messungen zur Untersuchung von 
Attributionseffekten auf die neurophysiologischen Korrelate der Fehlerverarbeitung verwendet.  
 
Es wurde eine klassische „Flanker - Aufgabe“ durch einen adaptiven Algorithmus so verändert, dass 
die Leistung der Versuchspersonen auf Zufallsniveau gehalten wurde. Einunddieselbe Aufgabe wurde 
dabei - nach einem Block ohne Manipulation - einer Versuchsgruppe als schwierig und der anderen 
Gruppe als einfach beschrieben. Damit konnte ermöglicht werden, stabile, differenzielle 
Ursachenwahrnehmungen für die Fehler zu induzieren. Die Gruppen unterschieden sich signifikant 
zwischen externer und interner Attribution über eine große Anzahl von Durchgängen; dabei blieben 
aber Anstrengung und Reaktionszeit konstant. Das verwendete Design erfüllt optimale Ansprüche für 
neurowissenschaftliche Studien und bietet damit eine neue Möglichkeit, das aktuelle Erlebnis 
unterschiedlicher Attributionen in kontrolliertem Setting zu untersuchen. 
 
Unter Verwendung der neu entwickelten Methode wurden ereigniskorrelierte Potenziale ermittelt, um 
den Einfluss von Attribution auf Fehler- und Feedbackverarbeitung zu untersuchen. Die ERN, eine 
frühe Komponente, welche mit Fehlerverarbeitung im Zusammenhang steht, war durch die 
unterschiedlichen Attributionen nicht verändert. 
 
Bedeutsam ist die Erkenntnis, dass die fERN - eine Komponente, die nach Feedbackverarbeitung 
auftritt, -  nur in der intern attributierenden Gruppe nach der Manipulation aufgetreten ist. Die fERN 
unterschied sich hier signifikant zwischen positivem und negativem Feedback. Dies bestätigt auch 
vorherige Befunde, die ebenfalls zeigen, dass für die fERN auch der emotionale Wert entscheidend ist.  
Die geringere Bedeutung des Fehlers und des Feedbacks für externe Manipulation zeigte sich 
zusätzliche in einer signifikant reduzierten P300 Amplitude bei Versuchspersonen, welche die 
Fehlerursache nicht sich selbst zuschrieben. 
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Zwei Publikationen sind im Zuge dieser Diplomarbeit von mir erstellt worden: 
 
Terbeck, S., Chesterman, P., Fischmeister, F., Leodolter, U., Bauer, H. (2008). Attribution and Social 
Cognitive Neuroscience: A new Approach for “online assessment” of causality ascriptions and their 
emotional consequences. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 173 (1), 13-19 
 
Terbeck, S., Fischmeister, F., Chesterman, P., Bauer. H. Experimental manipulation of causal 
ascription: Its effect on error and feedback processing in the brain (to be submitted) 
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5) Anhang 
 
1. Attributionsmanipulation 
 
1.1. ITACA Titelblatt (Praesentation vor der Flanker Task; Gruppe intern) 
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1.2. Attributionsfragebogen 
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1.3.Attributionsfragebogen (englisch), freie Uebersetzung 
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Explanations 
 
On the following pages you will find a brief description of situations during the recent task. For each 
situation there is a little selection of thoughts and feelings one could associate with the situation. 
 
You should now think back to those situations, or put yourself into the situation even if it might have 
not occurred for you. In the following you should decide how you feel on it, and to witch extend the 
mentioned thoughts apply to you. 
 
So there will be different thoughts for each situation, please mark for all, to witch extend they apply to 
you. Therefore you got four choices in the rage from “applies completely” to “applies in no way”. 
 
1 = Applies in no way 
2= Applies barley 
3= Applies often 
4= Applies completely 
 
Example 
 
Imagine you had committed some errors. 
 
a) “That’s bad luck”               1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
b) ”I did not try very hard.”    1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
 
 
Attend, that there are not “right” or “wrong” answers!  
 
Work on the questions speedy and spontaneously, without thinking about it to long. 
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1. Imagine, overall you got many answers right. 
 
a) My concentration ability  
      is quite good.                                              1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
b) That wasn’t  hard, other person                 1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
      could have done so as well 
c) I have worked very hard                            1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
d) Luck played a major role                           1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
 
2. What came to your mind when you committed errors? 
 
a) It seems that my attention  
and concentration ability is not very well.  1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
b) Because the task was difficult, 
 errors are likely.                                         1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
c) Why does misfortune always 
 have to follow me?                                    1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
d) Next time, I will work harder.                    1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
 
3. Imagine, overall you got many answers wrong 
 
1. Sure that was just chance and  
has got nothing to do with me.                  1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
2. I just don’t have an excellent  
concentration and attention ability.           1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
3. If I had worked harder,  
it wouldn’t have happened.                       1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
4. The requirements were extra high.            1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
 
4. Imagine, the experimentator would tell you, that because of the task, it has been    
      discovered that you have a low concentration ability. 
 
Maybe I have been to addle  
and demotivated.                                      1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
One can’t say that,  
lots of people perform badly on  
those kind of tasks.                                   1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
He could also have loaded me,  
you cannot know that before.                   1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I am not very good,  
if I am under pressure.                              1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
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5. What did you think about when you committed errors? 
 
a) It happens. Everything is destiny.           1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
b) I can’t manage performing well.             1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
c) “Damn”, I should 
 have taken more care.                            1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
 
6. Now, imagine please, you would get the information that overall you would have done well in 
lots of trails. 
 
a) I am applicative for those kind of tasks.  1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
b) Everyone could have done so.                 1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
c) Success is a matter of hard work.            1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
d) I don’t care,  
that could have happened to everyone,  
I can’t influence that.                               1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
 
7. What did you think about when you got positive Feedback during the task? 
 
a) I am talented.                                          1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
b) That was just easy.                                  1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
c) Just Chance.                                            1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
d) After all, I tried very hard.                      1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
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1.4.Schematische Darstellung des Versuchsdesings 
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2) SPSS Tabellen 
 
 
2.1. Tabelle Mann Whitney U-Test (Attributionsmanipulation) 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
2.2. SPSS Tabelle Verhaltensdaten (Flanker Task) 
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2.3. SPSS Tabelle ERN 
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2.4. SPSS Tabelle Differenzwellen ERN 
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2.5. SPSS Tabelle fERN 
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2.6. SPSS Tabelle P300 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
2.7. SPSS Tabelle: Differenz fERN P300 (Peak to peak Analyse) 
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